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I. Introduction
Do deposit insurance programs contribute to financial development?  Why have
so many governments adopted such programs, and what did they expect to achieve?  We
conduct an empirical analysis to examine the effect of deposit insurance on the size and
volatility of the financial sector, using a sample of fifty-eight countries.  Governments in
advanced economies and many developing economies grant formal deposit insurance in
the hope of reducing the risk of systemic failure of banks and hence stabilizing the
payments and financial system.  On occasions in the past, bank runs have destroyed the
payments system, with the resultant depression.  Credible deposit insurance is presumed
to forestall such runs.  Moreover, by bolstering depositors'  faith in the stability of the
system, deposit insurance may lead to a deeper financial system, which could contribute
to higher economic growth rates.'
However, deposit insurance can be socially counterproductive if the system is
not appropriately structured.  Under many deposit insurance schemes, if a depository
institution, such as a savings and loan firm, goes bankrupt, the government absorbs all
(or nearly all) of the depositors' losses. This weakens market discipline (i.e. monitoring
of bank activities by depositors and other bank stakeholders) and creates a moral hazard
problem, since there is now an incentive for depository institutions to engage in
excessively high risk activities, relative to socially optimal outcomes.  Especially in lax
'See  Levine (1997) on the links between financial depth and economic growth.
2regulatory environments, these incentives are likely to lead to greater systemic
instability.
The central question that we address in this paper deals with the impact of deposit
insurance programs on financial stability and financial development.  The stability
question is complementary to existing papers, particularly a recent study by Demirguc-
Kunt and Detragiache (DD,2000).  Based on evidence for 61 countries between 1980 and
1997, DD find that variations in coverage, funding or management of deposit insurance
schemes are significant determinants of the likelihood of banking crisis, especially across
countries where interest rates have been deregulated and the overall institutional
framework is weak.  We focus on the impact of deposit insurance on financial stability
and development in a longer horizon before the financial or banking system collapses
into a crisis.  Accordingly, our empirics are not based on crisis data.
Thus, our aim is to understand the impact of alternative deposit insurance design
features over a longer horizon. We focus on financial development, broadly defined to
include the level of financial activity, the stability of the banking sector, and the quality
of resource allocation as reflected in real sector performance (i.e., growth).  The
empirical construct is guided by recent theories of banking regulation that employ an
agency framework.
In short, we focus on the steady-state, forward looking effects of deposit
insurance.  Recent events have shown that in times of crises, no matter whether deposit
insurance is explicit or explicit, depositors tend to be bailed out anyway when systemic
problems arise.  Ex ante bail-out expectations, however, do influence bank risk-taking
3behavior even in stable circumstances, by truncating the negative tail of the distribution
of expected returns, and our empirical tests are designed to measure these effects.
Moreover, our paper extends the empirical analysis of deposit insurance schemes
in a couple of ways. First, we directly address the sample selection problems inherent in
analyzing the effects of deposit insurance programs.  The sample of countries that adopt
explicit deposit insurance is clearly not random, and thus we employ statistical
techniques that account for this selection process.  Another reason to adopt this approach
is that it may not be easy to categorize variations in coverage or funding within the
heterogeneous spectrum of countries lacking an official insurance arrangement.
Further, the same explicit deposit insurance program will likely have different
effects depending on the general institutional environment. For example, a recent article
by Reint Gropp and Jukka Vesala (2000) argues that in Europe implicit insurance has
meant an even higher potential for moral hazard than explicit systems. This is because,
though it introduces some uncertainty of being bailed out, the coverage of implicit
insurance may extend to a larger set of bank stakeholders compared to the case of explicit
laws protecting depositors alone.  In less developed countries, this might not hold -
lacking the institutional development to make limits binding, explicit deposit insurance
might offer no benefits over implicit.  We test, therefore, whether the effects of explicit
deposit insurance are dependent on proxies for the quality of banking regulation and
supervision.
Second,  in our empirical tests, we attempt to summarize the features of explicit
deposit insurance as completely as possible, rather than test the effects of individual
program features or a subset of features.  When considering the safety of their deposits, it
4is unlikely that depositors consider only one feature of a deposit insurance scheme, but
rather all the features together (coverage limits, types of deposits covered, and the
credibility of the insurer).  Similarly, when choosing whether to participate in a deposit
insurance program, banks likely consider not only their premium payments, but also
whether and how future payments will be adjusted to reflect portfolio risk and when those
payments will be collected.  To better account for the complementarities between
features of deposit insurance schemes, and to better reflect the totality of those features,
we categorize deposit insurance program features as reflecting either the generosity of
coverage to depositors or the requirements imposed upon member banks (which we call
entry hurdles).  We then test whether indices based on these two sets of features lead to
higher levels of financial activity, and whether any such financial sector growth comes at
a price in terms of instability.
Section II provides a motivation using some stylized facts about deposit insurance
programs.  In addition, it provides descriptive statistics, and highlights some puzzling
relationships between the individual program features, and between program features and
financial sector outcomes. The main purpose of this section is to introduce the reader to
the complexity of the problem under investigation and to show how simple bivariate
econometrics is not enough to draw robust conclusions from our sample data.
We look therefore (in section III) for a conceptual framework of how deposit
insurance affects the level and volatility of financial development. A simple model of
optimal portfolio selection is presented to illustrate how the introduction of insured
deposits tilts the optimal risk-taking behavior of banks.
5Section IV spells out the main hypotheses we draw from our theory and describes
the estimation techniques we employ to test them empirically. The nature of the data
available and the objectives of our analysis require us to summarize design features by
means of principal component indices and to adopt a generalized Tobit estimation
approach in order to avoid any sample selection bias.
Section V presents our results and section VI concludes.  This combination of
theory and evidence should, we hope, generate more reliable predictions about the effects
of deposit insurance on financial development for policy makers in developed and
developing countries alike.
II. Motivation: Stylized Facts
In this section we provide the observed design features of deposit insurance
programs and some stylized facts and descriptive statistics as a motivation for a more
detailed analysis conducted later.
A. Design Features of Deposit Insurance
Table 1 provides design features of deposit insurance categorized as reflecting
either generosity or entry hurdles.  By generosity, we mean those features that determine
how much compensation a depositor receives in the event that her bank fails.  This group
also contains features that determine the credibility of that compensation.  Entry hurdles
are the requirements imposed on banks in order to become a member of a deposit
insurance program.
The six variables grouped under the heading generosity are (1) coverage per
depositor, (2) a dummy indicating whether foreign currency deposits are covered, (3) a
dummy indicating whether interbank deposits are covered, (4) a categorical variable
6indicating whether the source of the program's  funding is banks, government, or joint, (5)
a categorical variable indicating whether the program is managed officially (by
government), privately, or jointly, and (6) a dummy indicating whether the program
requires depositor co-insurance (a deductible).  The entry hurdle variables (shaded in
Table 1) include (1) a dummy to indicate whether membership is compulsory, (2) a
dummy to indicate whether funding is on an ex ante or an as needed basis, (3) the annual
premium payment by member banks (expressed as a percentage of insured deposits), and
(4) a dummy indicating whether the premium payments are risk-adjusted (for the member
bank's  asset portfolio).
The two variables on funding source and on program management are, perhaps,
less clearly identified as aspects of generosity towards insured depositors.  Our idea is
that both variables may affect depositor perceptions of the credibility of the scheme.  A
scheme may advertise generous coverage, but that may make little difference for
financial development if potential depositors do not find it credible.  In that sense, these
variables measure the credibility of generosity.  In the empirical analysis that follows,
however, the qualitative results remain largely unchanged when we drop these variables
as measures of generosity, or even when we treat them as entry hurdles.
Policy makers could conceivably achieve the same objectives regarding
generosity or selectivity of member banks through different deposit insurance provisions.
The design features, therefore, may be either substitutes or complements for one another.
For example, a generous scheme may be one that grants high coverage per depositor, or
one that covers a wider variety of deposits (including, perhaps, foreign currency or
interbank deposits).  A less generous scheme might impose co-insurance on depositors,
7which obligates them to pay a 'deductible'  before their coverage is activated.  High entry
hurdles could be achieved through high member premium, or through risk-adjusted
premium payments.  Programs that require ex ante funding might also impose higher
costs on members than those that do not.
Table 1 presents simple pairwise correlation coefficients for deposit insurance
features for the twenty-nine countries in our sample that adopted explicit deposit
insurance schemes. 2 If two design features are substitutes for one another, we expect a
negative correlation - when one of those features appears, the other is less likely to be
found.  If features are complements, we expect a positive correlation.  That is, if a feature
is better able to achieve its intended objective when another feature is also adopted, we
expect the presence of one of them to make it more likely that the other is present.
The correlations among the generosity variables in Table 1 do not show any clear
pattern.  Only one is significantly different from zero, a negative relationship between
private management and coverage of interbank deposits, which suggests that private
schemes are less generous than publicly managed schemes in at least one way.  Others
approach significance.  For example, private management is positively associated with
co-insurance, while a government funding source is negatively associated with co-
insurance.  Both of those relationships also suggest that government-based programs are
more generous than privately managed programs.  However, taken as a whole, the low
significance levels and the relationships between the generosity variables defy a simple
summary explanation.
2 Variable  means are also  included  in parentheses  in the far left column  of Table I. Throughout  the
analysis,  implicit  deposit  insurance  is simply  defined  as lack of an explicit  scheme.
8The only significant relationship among the entry hurdle variables is the positive
one between premium payment level and ex ante funding, which may indicate that, in
creating higher entry hurdles, countries have tended to both increase premium payments
and require that they be made up front.  Other than that, however, there are no other
obvious relationships between the hurdles variables.  Because there are no strong patterns
of substitutability or complementarity between the deposit insurance variables, it may be
instructive to treat each feature individually and examine its association with the
dependent variables of primary interest, namely the growth rate and the volatility of
financial development.
B. Deposit Insurance Features and Financial Development
For the growth rate of financial development we use one variable from the asset
side of bank balance sheets, the growth of the ratio of credit to the private sector to GDP,
and another from the liabilities side, the growth of the ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP. 3
Similarly, to measure volatility of financial development, we use the coefficient of
variation (standard deviation divided by mean) in the private credit ratio and the liquid
liabilities ratio. 4 All four variables are measured over all years for which data are
available between 1960-1995, but only after the country adopted explicit deposit
insurance.  We focus on bank-based variables because banks are the primary financial
3 Because  this is a study  of the effects  of insuring  bank deposits,  we focus  on bank-based  indicators  of
financial  development.  We recognize  that  bank-based  financial  development  could  have implications  for
development  of the rest of the financial  sector,  although  Levine  and Zervos  (1998)  show that greater  stock
market  liquidity  imnplies  faster economic  growth  no matter  what the level of banking  development.  The
converse  also  holds  - greater  banking development  implies faster  growth,  regardless  of the level of stock
market  liquidity. These  results  suggest  that  bank-based  development  is unlikely  to dampen  the benefits  of
market-based  development.  In addition,  Deniirguc-Kunt  and Maksimovic  (1998) show  that increases  in
stock  market  development  actually  tend to increase  the use of bank finance  in developing  countries. If
anything,  the evidence  suggests  that these  two aspects  of the financial  system  may act as complements  in
fostering  growth.
9actors in most, if not all, of the countries in our analysis. 5 These indicators are standard
measures of financial development that have been used by other authors.  King and
Levine (1993, 1994) and Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000) find strong, often causal,
links between these bank-based indicators of financial development and economic
growth.  If we find that these indicators are affected by deposit insurance, therefore, it
should have implications for growth.
Late in the analysis, we also examine whether deposit insurance affects a more
explicitly structural variable, a concentration ratio measuring the assets of the top three
banks relative to total banking sector assets.  The Data Appendix provides additional
information on the sources and the construction of our variables.  Simple correlations
between our five dependent variables and individual deposit insurance features also do
not yield clear insights as to the effect of deposit insurance on financial development
(Table 2).  For example, coverage of foreign currency deposits is negatively associated
with the volatility of liquid liabilities, while coverage of interbank deposits is positively
associated with the same volatility measure.  Neither of those coverage measures is,
however, significantly linked to the volatility of credit to the private sector. Nor are any
of the other deposit insurance features significantly linked to either volatility measure.
Based on these results, it would be difficult to conclude that the moral hazard introduced
by a generous deposit insurance scheme causes greater financial sector volatility.
Results are just as puzzling for the growth rate variables.  The only significant
correlations are the negative ones between premium payments and the growth rates for
4 We refer to these  measures  as the 'volatility  of liquid  liabilities' and the 'volatility  of credit  to the private
sector' from this point  forward.
10both liquid liabilities and private credit.  This is somewhat surprising in that higher
premium payments, which could be an entry hurdle that might lead to a better roster of
banks, were actually associated with less financial development.  On the other hand, the
premium payments may have been higher expressly because of the low level of financial
development associated with an unstable financial sector prone to systemic failure.
Indeed, the correlations between premium payments and our two volatility measures are
positive and approach significance.
These premium results may reflect a deeper underlying incentive problem
associated with explicit deposit insurance.  Due to limited liability, bank equityholders
enjoy the upside benefits associated with a risky asset portfolio, but are largely protected
against the downside losses associated with non-performing assets.  By increasing savers'
faith in the formal financial system, credible explicit insurance could increase the level of
deposits.  Additional deposits imply more investable resources for the bank, and should
increase the upside benefits associated with holding a (larger) portfolio of risky assets.
However, these results are still puzzling.  We will explain the puzzle later in the context
of the theoretical analysis and the multivariate empirical analysis.
Finally, the results for the asset concentration variable are intriguing, but not very
robust.  For example, ex ante funding, which we thought of as an entry hurdle, is, as we
would expect, associated with greater concentration.  Similarly, compulsory membership
is negatively (though not quite significantly) associated with concentration.  However,
the most pronounced relationship is the negative one between co-insurance and
5 To cite just one example,  the United  States,  a country  whose financial  sector is dominated  by stock
markets  rather  than  banks, is excluded  from the analysis  because  it adopted  deposit  insurance  in 1934,  well
before  our sample  period.
11concentration.  Perhaps co-insurance, by limiting generosity, means fewer deposits in
total, which implies fewer sector entrants?
Aside from presenting the descriptive statistics and stylized facts, this section
illustrates the difficulty in isolating simple relationships between deposit insurance
features and financial development in a univariate analysis. These preliminary results
indicate that few, if any, of the variables that we thought of as affecting incentives either
through generosity or through bank entry hurdles is associated with either financial
volatility or financial development in a simple, predictable way.  Motivated by these
initially puzzling results, we will begin setting out a conceptual foundation as a guide to
the more detailed empirics, a foundation that appeals to agency paradigms in finance and
specifies how deposit insurance could conceivably affect financial development.  We will
find that some of the puzzles are consistent with the incentive effects of deposit
insurance, which will be examined in greater detail in the multivariate analysis of Section
IV.
III.  The Role of Deposit Insurance in Financial Stability and Resource
Mobilization:  Agency Theoretic Framework
We will characterize the potential investment distortion and resultant financial
instability that could arise from an ill-designed deposit insurance scheme by appealing to
agency paradigms in corporate finance.  The view that is widely held in finance is that
the firm (say a depostitory institution) is a nexus or network of contracts among various
parties or stakeholders, such as shareholders (bank owners), creditors (depositors),
employees, and  other stakeholders (regulators and tax payers). The rights of each class
of stakeholders in the firm are defined in contracts. While most stakeholders contract for
12fixed payoffs, the firm's owners hold residual claims on cash flow earnings. This gives
rise to potential conflicts among the stakeholders.  Left alone, each class of stakeholders
pursues its own interest which may be at the expense of other stakeholders. 6
Consider now just two classes of stakeholders:  equityholders (bank owners) and
debtholders (bank depositors). The debt contract may enable managers, working on
behalf of owners (equityholders), to make investment and financing decisions sub-
optimally by departing from the principle of value maximization. The reason is that
equityholders and creditors hold disjointed interests and that equity value maximization
would not be equivalent to overall firm value maximization (optimal resource
allocation).  The primary concern for equity value maximization is over the cash flows
in the non-bankrupt states, rather than the entire region of firm cash flows. Now
management, working in the best interests of existing shareholders, has an incentive to
alter the riskiness of the firm's investment activities (asset risk-shifting).  Riskier
investments, if successful, will benefit equityholders, but they will reduce the value of
collateralization to debtholders, if they fail.
Thus, projects that are otherwise profitable may be foregone in exchange for
high risk but inferior counterparts, leading to economic inefficiency. 7 Departures from
efficient investment strategies are detrimental to economic growth and development.
Therefore, the economic and financial envirom-nent  that fosters efficient contracting
among parties with diverse interests, promotes efficient allocation of resources and
economic development.
6 See Bamea, Haugen, and Senbet (1985) for further discussion of agency issues.
7In  addition to the asset substitution problern, the existence of outstanding debt inhibits profitable
investments, since the benefits would enhance the safety to creditors at the expense of equityholders.  This
problem manifests itself in the form that has come to be known as "underinvestment."
13Now we wish to pursue  the agency  analogy  to bank deposits  and deposit
insurance.  Consider  a bank that issues equity  and makes  investments  in loans  (e.g.,
commercial  real estate). The bank faces  a menu of investment  opportunities
characterized  by rewards  (loan quality)  and risks or volatilities. In this case, the all-
equity bank makes a risk choice that  maximizes  bank value (V*). However,  from the
standpoint  of the society  at large, all-equity  banks may  be sub-optimal,  if by issuing debt
(deposits),  they enhance  liquidity  services. This presumes  that bank deposits  and equity
are not perfect substitutes  in terms of liquidity  provision. 8 In this setting,  the objective
function of the social  planner can be thought  of as being guided  by these goals: (1)
minimizing  the loss of value resulting  from distortionary  investment  policy (agency
costs);  (2) maximizing  the value of banking activity  in the liquidity  services  that banks
provide (bank  liability  side) and in their  role as informed  agents in an environment  of
imperfect  information  - screening  and monitoring  of borrowers,  for instance  (bank  asset
side). Thus, the social value considers  the entire  picture of the role of banks as informed
agents (asset  side) and liquidity  providers  (liability  side). 9
8 Diamond  and  Rajan (1998, 1999)  provide  a theory  of how such liquidity  services  arise. They start  from
the proposition  that entrepreneurs  have  projects  in which  the cash  flows that  they can generate  exceed  those
that anyone  else could generate  in the same  circumstances.  They  assume  that an outside  financier  who
invests  in these  projects  at an early stage  develops  specific  knowledge  about  how best to re-deploy  the
project's assets. Such financiers  can more  credibly  liquidate  a project. The specific  abilities  of the
entrepreneur  and the financier  make the project  and its financing  an illiquid  bundle  of assets  - by
construction,  no other financier/entrepreneur  pair value  the project as highly.
Banks  act as a commitment  device  that solves  this liquidity  problem. Because  of its fragile  deposit-based
capital structure,  a bank can commrit  to pass through  to depositors  the entire amount  that it expects  to
collect using  its specific  abilities. Any attempt  to extort  rents by threatening  to withdraw  these  specific
abilities  will be met  by a run, which  disintermediates  the bank and drives  its rents to zero. When  some
depositors  want  their money  back  in the 'ordinary course  of business,'  the bank does not have to pressure
the entrepreneur,  it simply  borrows  from new depositors  that also  understand  the bank's underlying
incentive  to  behave well. In this way banks, "enter  into a Faustian  bargain,  accepting  a rigid and fragile
capital structure  in return for the ability  to create  liquidity."
9  See John,  John,  and Senbet  (1991)  for a complete  discussion  of the social  planner's objective  function  in
the context  of depository  institutions.
14In this section, we focus on the economic consequences of deposit insurance by
taking it as given that deposit insurance is already in place and that banks issue deposit
liabilities, along with equity (bank capital). In the advanced economies and many
developing countries, deposits issued by banks and thrift institutions are insured by the
governments.  Given the risk incentive problems that arise, abolishing deposit insurance
may seem reasonable.  However, in countries that lack formal deposit insurance
schemes, including most African countries, deposits are implicitly insured even when
they are not explicitly insured.'0
Consider partitioning of the payoffs to bank shareholders in Figure 1 when
deposit financing with a promised payment of F is outstanding.  Given that bank asset
cash flows are X, bank owners face a residual payoff of MAX (0, X-F), and uninsured
depositors face a payoff of MIN (X, F).  If deposits were fully insured, the insuring
agency picks up the shortfall, MAX (0, F-X), so that depositors end up with the full
promised payment, F.
Now the incentive effects of deposit insurance are analogous to private agency
conflicts.  The payoff to the bank owners is isomorphic to that of a call option and the
government obligation is equivalent to a put option. When deposits are guaranteed,
depositors themselves face no risk.  However, risk due to the risk increasing incentives
of the banker is transferred to an insuring agency. For bank equityholders, the value of
their option increases with both the value of future cash flows and the volatility of those
flows:
10 In the empirical tests that follow, we can cornpare financial sector performance before and after the
adoption of explicit insurance.  This provides some information about the relative merits of explicit versus
implicit insurance, but the findings are based on the subset of countries that eventually adopted an explicit
15Value of equityholder's option = f(expected cash flows, a)
(+)  (+)
where a is the volatility of bank asset cash flows. Because the option becomes more
valuable as the volatility of cash flows increases, the portfolio of bank assets that
generates those flows is riskier than it otherwise might be.
In short, bank owners gain by choosing riskier asset portfolios.  Due to the
convexity of payoffs to bank equity capital, they take full advantage of the up-side
benefits but face limited down-side risk due to limited liability. Thus, owners of banks
financed by deposits have incentives to take risk beyond that which is optimal for an "all
equity" bank.  In fact, this risk-shifting  behavior by banks has been widely viewed as a
major culprit in the savings and loan crisis in the United States. The financial deregulation
of the 1  980s led to increased incentives for limited liability thrifts and banks to engage
in excessively risky lending, such as LDC loans and real estate loans, hoping for big
payoffs under favorable conditions and transferring losses to the insurance agencies
under adverse conditions.
In this paper we will draw some testable implications from the agency perspective
of risk-shifting on the relationship between deposit insurance and financial stability, as well
as development. The analysis needs to be formalized so as to draw such implications. We
use the framework of John, Saunders, and Senbet (2000) to provide a reduced form
characterization of bank investment incentives.  1 A representative depository institution
(bank) has a representative portfolio of risky assets (loans).  These investment
opportunities can be characterized by their rewards (a schedule of means) and their risks
scheme.  Potential effects may be different for countries in Africa, or elsewhere, that have yet to adopt
explicit insurance.
16(volatilities) of the terminal cash flows from the loan.  A typical investment opportunity
set {(V()s),)  g Q} is shown in Figure 2 as a concave production fumction. For
generality, we also include a function that has a flat region as volatility changes so as to
admit banks that have investments with zero net present value.
Central to the bank asset or lending risk incentive problem is imperfect
observability by outsiders (depositors and regulators) of the asset or lending quality
choices made by corporate insiders (bank managers).  If asset risk choices were to be
observed completely, forcing contracts (or regulatory devices) can be structured to
achieve the first-best, efficient solution.  Thus, in the context of our analysis, the
investment and the associated risk choices made by the bank (as embodied in the loans
extended or assets selected) are viewed as "private action." That is, there is imperfect
external monitoring of the risk choices by outsiders (including regulators).
Given incomplete contracting regarding the risk choices, bank insiders
(management) make investment and risk choices to maximize the value of the structure
of their own claims, rather than maximizing the total value of the bank, V(C). The value
cs denotes the bank's value-maximizing risk choice [ i.e., a* maximizes V(C), see Figure
2]. Consider that deposit financing, with promised payment F, is currently outstanding. Let
a(F) be the risk level at which the value of bank equity, E(a), is maximized, presuming
management is totally aligned with bank owners. As in Figure 1, bank equity can be
viewed as a call option which increases in value as the volatility of bank assets
increases.  That means bank equity value is maximized along the value frontier on the
right hand side of V* in Figure 2.  However, the risk incentive effect is limited by the
The more  detailed  formalization  is given in the Appendix.
17concavity of the bank investment schedule, since the decline in V adversely affects the
value of equity.  At the margin, the pure volatility effect is offset by the value effect (see
Appendix for a fortnal representation).
With a sufficiently high level of debt (deposit financing), insiders or bank
management (deciding on behalf of bank owners) depart from the first best risk
outcome. Thus, the investment implemented will be affected by the amount of bank
capital in place and its complement, the level of debt financing.  Bank management will
invest up to an asset risk choice level of cai(F),  which is higher than cai, to maximize the
value of bank equity. The distortion in risk choice, as represented by the risk deviation,
aAF) - Yj depends on the level of bank capital as well as the investment schedule i faced
by the bank.  Moreover, since ai(F) - C  is decreasing in the fraction of bank capital in
place, it provides a motivation for capital regulation, and for linking the level of bank
capitalization to the pricing of  deposit insurance. Thus, deposit insurance premium should
be based on measures of risk, along with measures of bank capital.
Now consider multiple banks with their own unique investment schedules, such
as in Figure 3.  The value-maximizing level of risk for the investment opportunity i is ai*,
i = 1,2,3. For unimodal structures, such as VI and V2, there is a unique value-maximizing
level of risk, represented by a,* and a2*, respectively. In other words, the value-
maximizing levels of risk differ for different portfolios of bank activities, and this has
regulatory implications.  First,  since banks may have different opportunities to exploit
risk within any capital zone, categorizing all within the same zone into an identical risk
classification is misleading.  In this sense, capital ratios may be poor proxies for
18measuring bank safety.  Second, the regulatory corrective actions should not be designed
to homogenize all banks to some common pool of risk in the guise of restrictions on
asset risk choices.  For instance, these measures may push a bank with activity set 2 to
go below a2*.  Third, capital regulation can be beneficial for critically undercapitalized
banks.  As ai(F) - a,  is larger with greater leverage (lower capital ratios), regulatory
measures designed to move a bank which is critically undercapitalized to a higher level
of capitalization will reduce the risk distortion, a1(F) - ari.  In this sense, capital
regulation increases bank value or  moves the bank closer to an efficiency boundary.
Finally, it should be mentioned that the deposit insurance premium will now be set
corresponding to a level of risk ca(F), which is a function of the degree of capitalization,
which is inversely related to F (see Appendix), along with measures of the risk class of
bank activities.
The foregoing discussion underscores that the effectiveness of capital regulation
depends crucially on banks'  asset characteristics. To dramatize this point further,  we
can resort to an investment technology or bank asset characteristic for which capital
regulation is entirely ineffective.  Consider the investment schedule 2, graphed in Figure
2, where U2 is not unique.  In fact, all levels of a2 yield value V2(a2) along the flat stretch
of the opportunity curve. This investment schedule is entirely feasible when there is a
large supply of risky investments with zero net present value (e.g., risky assets in
financial markets).  In this limiting case, large premiums may be required to take
account of high levels of risk-shifting, even with a high degree of capital regulation.
12 Consider,  for example,  the differences  between  the investment  schedules  for money  center  banks and
rural credit institutions.
19The foregoing simple theoretical framework (and the Appendix) are rich enough
to draw some testable implications that guide and motivate the empirics in the next
section:
1.  Financial Instability and Moral Hazard (Volatility Effect):  Deposit
insurance may prevent panic and bank runs, but it transfers risk to the insuring agency.
In a poorly regulated environment, banks have an incentive to engage in investment
(loan) activities which are excessively risky, relative to the socially desirable level of
risk.  The excessive risk taking behavior of a bank means that the bank assets have
become more volatile beyond the socially optimal level of risk.  With many such banks,
the financial system becomes more unstable; a+(F)  - cyi > 0.  Thus, with unresolved
moral hazard, deposit insurance is counterproductive, and it induces more, not less,
stability in the financial system.
2.  Economic Inefficiency (Value Effect):  Not only do the incentive effects of
deposits and deposit insurance lead to excessive risk-taking, they also distort bank
investment activities (loans) away from the socially optimal level of investments.  In
essence, the existence of deposit insurance leads to a decline in the overall economic
performance as the overall bank values diminish in association with increased risk
taking and financial instability (see figure 2); V(F) - V* <  0.  The regulator may also
impose mandatory restrictions on bank asset risk choices so as to limit risk-taking, as
done in certain regulatory regimes, such as the US.  However, this would lead to socially
counterproductive outcomes.  This is because, direct monitoring of bank asset portfolio
(loans) through mandating its risk levels may push the bank to levels below the socially
optimal level of bank  risk, a (q*).  Suppose the regulator wishes to induce  banks to a
20common pool of risk (or more generally to minimal risk).  This would be distortionary,
given that banks are characterized by differential investment opportunity sets as in
Figure 3, with different risk choices and hence differential maximal  (q*j), that are
optimal from the standpoint of overall value maximization or efficiency.
3.  Capital Regulation Effect (Entry Hurdle and Limited Effectiveness):
Various reforms have been proposed to correct the distorted incentives facing
bankers.  Some proposals, such as risk-based deposit insurance premium and risk-based
capital, attempt to replicate the incentives that would be provided by the market.  Like
risk-based premium, risk-based capital has some intuitive appeal as an entry hurdle.
Theory predicts, however, that neither will be a completely satisfactory solution, but for
different reasons.  Risk-based premium payments suffer from a time inconsistency
problem described in more detail below.  Similarly, risk-based capital regulation is of
limited effectiveness for the reasons listed next.
a.  Capital Regulation:  The  motivation for capital-based regulation is clear
from the Appendix.  As shown there [see (b) and (c) of A4], the extent of risk
undertaken beyond the optimal level,  a[q(F)] - a(q*), as well as the value lost due to
risk-shifting,  NPV(q*) - NPV[q(F)], are both functions of bank equity capital. With
higher bank capital, (i.e., lower F), the incentive for risk-shifting is mitigated, so that a
is lower.  Looking at Figure 2,  additional capital infusion moves the bank back toward
the efficient level of risk and investment value.
Unfortunately, there are limitations with capital regulation. We begin dramatizing
them by considering the limiting case of an all-equity bank.  By definition, such a bank
receives no deposit funding and thus poses no risk to anyone but its owners.  In that
21sense, one incentive problem is resolved regarding the riskiness of bank assets. But, as
described above, a key component of the social value of financial services comes from
the liquidity that banks provide, and an all-equity bank does not adequately serve that
purpose.
Capital regulation also has limitations under more realistic conditions because:
(a) although the incentives are improved with more infusion of bank capital, the
distortions and excessive risks are never eliminated for deposit insurance which even
minimally imposes risk on the insuring agency.  In the parlance of the Appendix, there
will be risk-shifting for all values of F > L, although the magnitudes of the costs are
reduced;13 and (b) given the variation in bank asset risk characteristics (portfolios),
capital regulation has to be bank-specific, and hence hard to implement.  This also brings
home that standardized capital requirements are sub-optimal, and casts serious doubt on
the usefulness of rules-based approaches, such as in the Basle Accord.
b.  Deposit Insurance Premium Effect (Time-Inconsistency and
Ineffectiveness as Entry Hurdle): Our framework is rich enough to allow for the
specification of a fair deposit insurance premium which can be structured as a function of
the bank capital ratio (F) and the observable parameters of the bank investment schedule
as specified in the Appendix  {I, H, L}.  The pricing of deposit insurance is possible
despite the existence of the moral hazard problem arising from imperfect observability of
private investment incentives controlled by bank insiders or decision-makers.  This is
because the regulator can calculate the incentive-based risk choices induced by the level
13 Ideally,  we would  perform  cross-country  tests on whether  higher  capital  standards  imnply  lower  sector
volatility. However,  at this  point, cross-country  data on capital  standards  are not nearly  as comprehensive
as for deposit  insurance  programs. As a result,  the empirical  section  of the paper focuses  only  on deposit
insurance  features.
22of bank capitalization employed by the institution and the parameters of the bank asset
investment schedule.  From the Appendix, a deposit level F > L induces an investment
policy [q(F)] so that a fairly priced, revenue neutral insurance premium can be specified
as follows:
7r(F) = q(F) max(O, F - I)  +  (1/2)(I  - q(F))2 max(O, F - L)
where q(F) is specified in A4 of the Appendix.  Under the preceding
specification, a fair deposit insurance should only cover the states of nature yielding low
investment returns (L) and possibly internediate  returns (I) for high levels of deposits. If
the bank can obtain an insurance with a premium 7n  <  n (F), the equityholders gain a
transfer of wealth of 7t  (F) - rt from the regulator. However, it should be noted that,
although a fair insurance premium covers the regulator's loss, it does not induce the
Pareto optimal  investment  policy,  since  NPV(q(F))  is still lower than  NPV(q*).  Due to a
time inconsistency problem, higher premium payment does not generally imply that
banks will hold less risky assets.  There is a need for incentive based regulation in view
of the inadequacy of deposit insurance premia.14
There is another way to see the time inconsistency problem of deposit insurance
premium.  The govemment agency or private entity that offers deposit insurance might
set risk-adjusted premia that account for these incentives.  However, once such premia
are paid, bank equityholders have no incentive to reduce the risk profile of their assets.
To maximize the value of equity under limited liability, they will continue to hold the
14 An appropriately  designed  incentive  compatible  compensation  may help alleviate  managerial  agency
problems. In particular,  if the incentive  features  of compensation  are tied to performance  through  stock
appreciation  rights,  stock option contracts,  and deferred  compensation,  managers  may  have incentives  to
increase  the value  of the firm (see John, Saunders,  Senbet,  2000).
23portfolio of risky assets that maximizes their expected upside benefits.  The choice of
bank assets may be completely divorced from the premia level.  If the benefits associated
with additional deposits and a larger risky portfolio outweigh premium costs, deposit
insurance may be ultimately destabilizing.  By broadening the pool of savings in the
formal banking sector, explicit deposit insurance may therefore contribute to increased
volatility, and risk-adjusted premia may be unable to prevent it. This may be what
underlies the insignificant univariate relationships between risk-adjusted premium
payments and financial volatility.  We will investigate this more thoroughly in the
multivariate tests that follow.
4.  Optimal  Regulation  and the Rule of Law: The preceding  discussion
underscores the distortionary effects of deposit insurance in a poorly regulated
environment. Capital regulation is one way to mitigate the problem, but its effectiveness
is limited  (see 3 above).  However, as John, Saunders, and Senbet (2000) show, it is
possible to come up with a more efficient banking regulatory scheme by exploiting the
incentive features of bank management compensation.  The existence of explicit deposit
insurance facilitates this, since the insurance premium can be determined on the basis of
not only capital rules but also incentive features that include base salary, equity
participation, and bonus.  The basic idea is these features can be designed to make bank
management sensitive to the interests of both depositors (and regulators) and bank
owners.  Of course, the environment that fosters the rule of law and enforceability of
contracts will facilitate the effectiveness of such an incentivized regulation. For instance,
in an environment where regulators themselves have distorted incentives, the optimally
designed banking regulation may not be implemented (see Hauswald and Senbet, 1999).
24In the following empirics we control for optimal regulation through rule of law
indicators.  15
IV. Empirics
A.  Motivation for Indices and Estimation  Technique.
Our central predictions are centered around the effects of deposit insurance features
on financial volatility and growth.  The specific hypotheses are spelled out in Section B
below.  To construct empirical tests of our predictions on the effects of deposit insurance,
we re-packaged the data described in Tables 1 and 2. We first synthesized the
information contained in our database regarding the generosity and selectivity (entry
hurdles) of deposit insurance systems into two main principal component indices.'6 As
noted above, using the original features instead of a few conglomerate indices makes it
more difficult to produce a simple, coherent analysis of the extremely diverse regulatory
schemes adopted around the world.
On a practical level, the effects of deposit insurance programs on the structure and
performance of the banking sector may not be evident for some time.  As a result, we
computed our indicators of financial sector growth and stability at the country level, and
aggregated the data over long periods of time.  The study is, therefore, more akin to a
cross-sectional rather than a time series analysis.  This limits our degrees of freedom, thus
making it unwise to include each design feature as a separate explanatory variable.
However, our approach yields correlations that are quite robust.
In addition, the use of indices makes for a more direct correspondence between our
regression variables and the theoretical concepts outlined above; this greatly facilitates
15 We recognize that adequate rule of law is necessary but, in some cases, not sufficient for an optimal
regulatory scheme.
25the task of studying simple linear relationships between deposit insurance features and
financial performance.  It also makes it possible to formulate more flexible policy
recommendations, allowing for tailor-made country specific solutions.  In other words, if
high scores on a conglomerate index are found to be positively (or negatively) correlated
with financial performance indicators, there is still a number of possible configurations of
the underlying design features that a country may be advised to pursue. As the same
purpose is conceivably achieved in different settings by different means, a one-size-fits-
all, best practice approach (in terms of single design features) may not be optimal in the
face of country-specific socioeconomic constraints.
From an econometric perspective, since some design features are closely related
(as they express different aspects of coverage, etc.), including principal component
indices in the regression analysis represents a way to avoid, at the same time, potential
problems both of multicollinearity  (if we were to include in the regression highly
correlated design features) and of omitted variable bias (in case we decided to omit some
arbitrarily due to our limited degrees of freedom).  As a technical note, we employ
principal component analysis rather than alternative techniques, such as factor analysis,
because the resulting indices are simple linear combinations of the original design
variables using "optimal" weights.17 Therefore, regression results involving such indices
can easily be translated in terms of a package of single design features, with the
additional flexibility noted above.
16  See pp. 5-7 for detailed description of both generosity and entry hurdle variables.
a  By contrast, in factor analysis, weights are obtained by mninimizing  the information lost in replacing a
whole matrix of design features with one or more vectors that account for most of the variation in the
original component variables.  Those vectors do not correspond directly to any particular design feature.
This makes it more difficult to provide specific policy advice regarding program design.
26A few remarks should be made to motivate our generalized Tobit estimation
approach.  An important goal of this line of research is to advise countries contemplating
the adoption of explicit deposit insurance whether they should do so, and what types of
programs have worked best in fostering financial development.  It would be ideal,
therefore, if the estimated relationships between deposit insurance features and financial
performance consistently extended to the whole population of countries.  Such hopes are
dashed, however, because data on design features are available only for the restricted
(clearly non-random) sub-sample of countries that have adopted an explicit deposit
insurance system in the first place.
We address the risk of estimating a relationship which only suits a subset of
selected countries by adopting a two-step sample selection model.  We first estimate for
all countries, the probability of adopting explicit deposit insurance and then use these
"sample weights" in the second stage (the actual regression), to minimize the
distortionary impact of the observations which are most likely to be selected in the first
stage. The second stage regressions, which describe the effects of different types of
explicit deposit insurance (as summarized by our indices) on barnking  sector growth and
stability, can also offer comparisons of average sector performance before and after the
adoption of a program.  In that sense, they do provide information about the relative
merits of implicit versus explicit deposit insurance, but based on the subset of countries
selected in the first-stage regression.
As described more fully below, selected countries, those that adopt explicit
insurance, tend to be more institutionally developed and display lower financial sector
volatility than countries that retain implicit schemes.  In that sense, our results may not be
27an adequate guide as to the effects of explicit insurance on less institutionally developed
countries.  But to foreshadow our results a bit, we do find that, even within the subset of
countries that adopt explicit insurance, subsequent sector volatility is relatively high and
long-run sector growth is relatively low  in those countries that have relatively weak
institutions.  We suspect that, had they adopted explicit insurance, the results might have
been even more devastating for the subset of countries that retained implicit schemes
throughout.  Finally, as for concerns of simultaneity bias, if it is well possible that the
decision to adopt explicit deposit insurance (or none at all) may depend on financial
performance, it is perhaps conceptually less likely that specific deposit insurance features
are designed conditional on these macro-indicators. 18
B. Hypotheses
Armed with variables (indices) that better summarize the generosity and entry
hurdle concepts, we conduct empirical tests which are motivated by an incentive-based
theory of depository institutions as discussed in the last section.  The indices enable us to
state our hypotheses succinctly.  Before we do, however, we need to introduce one
additional variable.  As noted above, any adverse effects of deposit insurance may be
mitigated by effective bank regulation and supervision.  Even if depositors have little
incentive to monitor their banks, a sound regulatory environment may limit some abuses
and lead to healthier bank asset portfolios.
Lacking a perfect summary statistic for the quality of the regulatory environment,
we rely on a six-point measure of the quality of the rule of law created by the
Is  Moreover,  in a very  similar  setting,  Dernirguc-Kunt  and Detragiache  (1999)  provide  a series  of
instrumental  variable  tests refuting  the hypothesis  that  the specific  program  features  are endogenous.
28International Country Risk Guide (ICRG).  19 Higher scores indicate "sound political
institutions, a strong court system, and provisions for an orderly succession of power."
While not a perfect indicator -- the U.S., for example, which scores well on the index, did
suffer the S&L crisis --  the index has been used in the empirical financial literature for
purposes similar to ours.  Authors have used the index in growth regressions as a general
measure of institutional development (Knack and Keefer, 1995) and as a proxy for
institutional development in the financial sector (Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache,
1997).2o
Using simple interaction terms, the ICRG legal index enables us to measure the
effects of generosity and entry hurdles in weak versus strong regulatory environments.
As laid out in the theory section, more generous deposit insurance schemes should
increase F, the level of deposits outstanding, and a, the riskiness of banking sector asset
portfolios.  We expect these effects to be reflected in increases in our two volatility
measures.  Again, however, the incentive to increase riskiness, and thus volatility, should
be more effectively curtailed in sound regulatory environments.  These thoughts lead to
our first two hypotheses:
19  Legal tradition  data are averaged  over 1985-1991  for each of our countries.
20 More  specifically,  because  the index  is a good  predictor  of the use of long-term  debt  by large finms  in
their  cross-country  sample,  Demnirguc-Kunt  and  Maksimovic  (1998)  use it as an indicator  of the ease with
which  firms  can enter into long-term  contracts. They  point  out that it is a better indicator  of the quality  of
the contracting  environment  than specific  differences  in legal codes  because  firns may be able to
compensate  for  the absence  of specific  legal  protections  by altering  the provisions  of contracts. La  Porta et
al. (1999) demonstrate  that countries  with  legal codes  that  afford a relatively  high level of protection  for
investors  tend also to have stronger  enforcement  of laws as reflected  in higher  ICRG index scores. Our
index,  therefore,  rnight  be thought  of as a summarizing  both the quality  of the regulations  on the books and
the quality  of enforcement  of those regulations.  Finally,  Barth,  Caprio,  and Levine  (2000)  create a general
measure  of good  government  by computing  the average  value of three variables:  our  rule of law index  and
the ICRG indices  for "risk of expropriation  by the government"  and for "the degree  of corruption." They
find  that those countries  that score  well on their good  government  index tend to impose  fewer  regulatory
restrictions  on their banks  and have less state  ownership  of the banking sector. While  each of these  studies
illustrates  a slightly  different  aspect  of financial  sector development  that is captured  by the rule of law, it is
29HI:  Generous deposit insurance schemes lead to greater financial sector
volatility.  If so, the coefficient for 'generosity'  should be positive and
significant in the volatility regressions.
H2: Any increased volatility due to relatively generous deposit insurance
should be mitigated by a sound regulatory environment. If so, the
coefficient for 'generosity x law' should be negative and significant.
Hypotheses regarding entry hurdles are qualitatively similar to those for
generosity, but they tie into the theory section slightly differently.  In particular, one
could view entry hurdles as a selection device that creates a roster of insured banks less
prone to take on risky assets.  In that sense, much like some forms of bank regulation or
supervision, the entry hurdles could contribute to a less volatile financial sector.  Indeed,
risk-adjusted premium payments, a component of the entry hurdle index, may provide an
incentive for banks with riskier asset portfolios to eschew insurance.  On the other hand,
because of the time inconsistency problem discussed in the theoretical section, even well-
priced deposit insurance may have no impact on risk incentives. We leave it to our
empirical tests to sort between these hypotheses.
For purposes of exposition, it will be easier to invert our entry hurdle index (a
"good" thing) into an index of weak selection criteria (a "bad" thing).  In that way,
predictions about the coefficients for generosity (also a "bad" thing) and its interaction
with the legal index are now identical to those for poor selection:
H3:  Lower entry hurdles lead to greater financial sector volatility.  If so,
the coefficient for 'poor selection'  should be positive and significant.
H4:  Increased volatility due to low entry hurdles should be mitigated by a
sound regulatory environment.  If so, the coefficient for 'poor selection x
law' should be negative and significant.
a proxy for the quality of regulation and supervision that has been widely used in the empirical financial
literature.
30Our theory does not unambiguously resolve whether increased riskiness (6)
coincides with improvements or declines in V, the value of financial intermediation.
Some volatility (riskiness) is probably necessary to create a vibrant financial sector
capable of identifying new, relatively productive ventures.  Too much volatility can be a
sign of too much risk taking.  Moreover, the dislocation associated with frequent
systemic collapses is likely to lead to slower long-run financial development and
economic growth.  As proxies for V we use the growth rates in our financial indicators
described above.  We view them as measures of long-run financial development.  The
mechanism by which generosity affects, first, the level of deposits, and, second, the
riskiness of sector assets and the value of financial intermediation, makes it the more
natural channel through which deposit insurance could affect financial development, and
thus our growth rates.  The mechanism by which entry hurdles affect long-run financial
development is less clear, at least in the context of the theory section, but we also test
whether they, too, have an effect on growth rates.  We expect that the potential positive
effects of deposit insurance on financial sector growth are likely to be most pronounced
in a sound regulatory environment, one less prone to systemic collapse.  Our final two
hypotheses are, therefore:
H5:  Overly generous deposit insurance and poor selection of member
banks may lead to sector instability and slower long-run financial
development.  If so, the coefficients for 'generosity'  and 'poor selection'
should be negative in the financial sector growth rate regressions.
H6:  The adverse growth effects of generosity and poor selection should be
reduced by a sound regulatory environment.  If so, the coefficients for
'generosity x law' and 'poor selection x law'  should be positive in the
financial sector growth rate regressions.
31We can state our central testable predictions with the following simple regression
model:
Yi = ao  + 8GlGi  + fiG2GiLaw!  + PHIHi  + fH 2HjLawI  +  8xXj  + frRi  + £i
where Yi  is the growth rate of an indicator of financial development, or a measure of the
volatility of that indicator in country i; G is the generosity of deposit insurance; H
represents the weakness of the entry hurdles, or requirements, imposed by the deposit
insurance program on member banks; Law is an index of the quality of the rule of law; X
is a set of macroeconomic control variables that could also affect financial sector
development and volatility; and R represents other potentially relevant aspects of the
deposit insurance program or the banking sector. For the regressions in which financial
volatility is the dependent variable, Hypothesis 1 (HI) implies that fGI>O;  H2 implies
3G2<0;  H3 implies flHI>O;  and H4 implies flH2<0.  For the regressions in which the growth
rate of a indicator of financial development is the dependent variable, H5 implies that
13G1<O and flHI<0, while  H6 implies  that flG2>0  and #H2>0.
In addition, as described above, we include a first-stage regression to control for
the selection bias associated with the adoption of explicit deposit insurance.  In that stage
we rely on two measures - prior financial sector volatility and the legal index - to
separate countries that adopted deposit insurance from those that did not.  As in Cull
(1998) we expect that strong legal tradition is positively associated with adoption of
explicit deposit insurance, while prior volatility is negatively associated with adoption, as
countries have been less apt to enact deposit insurance in turbulent periods.2 '
21 Like our other volatility measures, prior volatility is measured as the coefficient of variation in our two
financial indicators.  For countries that never adopted explicit deposit insurance, the prior volatility
measure was calculated over the entire period 1960-1997 (although data availability implied that, in
practice, most observations were calculated over a smaller subset of that period).  For countries that
32The control variables in the second-stage regressions (which use either volatility
or growth rates of our financial indicators as the dependent variable) include inflation,
real growth, the years since deposit insurance has been in place, and the banking sector
asset concentration ratio (described above). High inflation, which may make some types
of financial contracting more problematic, should have an adverse effect on financial
growth rates.  The effect on sector volatility is more difficult to predict.  Real growth
should have a positive effect on growth rates, but a less clear effect on volatility.  Years
since adoption may be positively associated with both volatility and financial growth as it
may take time before the effects of deposit insurance are evident.
Predictions regarding concentration are ambiguous.  It may be associated with
reduced volatility, but have a negative effect on growth rates, because a small number of
dominant banks may be less inclined to hunt down new investment opportunities than
would a higher number of less-established banks.  Risk taking on the part of less-
established banks may, however, be so destabilizing as to retard long-term financial
sector growth.  While not our central focus, these control variables should help us to
estimate more accurately the effects of generosity and entry hurdles on financial
development.  Like the dependent variables in the second-stage regressions, these control
variables are averaged over all years since the adoption of deposit insurance.
V.  Results
Regardless of the dependent variable (the volatility of either private credit or
liquid liabilities), all specifications in Table 3 provide support for hypotheses one and
two.  The significant positive coefficient for generosity indicates that relatively generous
adopted explicit deposit insurance, the prior volatility measure was calculated over the period just prior to
adoption.  Qualitative results are similar regardless of whether we use the three-year or the five-year
33deposit insurance schemes do coincide with greater subsequent financial sector volatility.
The significant negative coefficient on the generosity/law interaction term indicates that a
sound regulatory environment can mitigate the volatility associated with generous deposit
insurance. Recall that the legal index is measured on a six-point scale.  At the risk of
reading too much into our model, the estimated coefficients imply that only countries
with the highest scores on the legal index (five or six) can expect to experience little or
no increase in financial volatility due to the generosity of their deposit insurance scheme.
None of the developing  countries in our sample satisfy that criterion.
The specifications in Table 3 provide no support for hypotheses three and four.
The insignificant coefficients for the index of weak selection criteria and for the
selection/law interaction term indicate that the entry hurdles imposed on member banks
have little effect on subsequent volatility, regardless of the quality of regulation and
supervision.  Taken together, the generosity and the selection results imply that, if a
country adopts a generous deposit insurance program, it should not expect to curtail
subsequent increases in financial volatility through careful selection of member banks.
The overall quality of regulation and supervision may help limit volatility associated with
deposit insurance, but the specific rules governing which banks have access to insured
deposits appear to play no role.  Again, the ineffectiveness of entry hurdles, especially
risk-adjusted premium payments, may stem from time inconsistency problems.
The specifications in Table 4 help us assess whether the increased volatility
associated with deposit insurance accelerates or retards long-run financial development.
The negative significant coefficient for generosity indicates that depositors that feel
relatively secure may inadvertently contribute to slower long-term financial development.
interval  just prior to adoption. Results  for the three-year  period appear  below.
34However, the positive significant coefficient on the generosity/law interaction term
indicates that a sound regulatory environment may act as an adequate substitute for
monitoring of banks by depositors.  Indeed, the estimated coefficients imply that
countries with better legal traditions experience greater long-term financial development
after introducing generous deposit insurance.  By drawing more savers into the formal
financial system generous deposit insurance can, therefore, have a positive impact on
financial development, but only if the appropriate regulatory and supervisory safeguards
are in place.  Again, most of the World Bank's client countries appear to lack those
safeguards.
A few words should be said about differences between the results for private
credit growth (specifications 1-4, Table 4) and for liquid liabilities growth (specifications
5-8, Table 4).  The estimated coefficients imply that liquid liabilities grow more rapidly
after the introduction of generous deposit insurance for all but the countries with the
weakest legal traditions (i.e., a zero score on the legal index).  By contrast, the models
indicate that generosity coincides with a higher subsequent private credit growth rate, but
only in countries that score five or six on the legal index.  The two results suggest that the
effects of generous deposit insurance are reflected differently on the asset versus the
liability side of bank balance sheets.  Generosity will prompt more savers to deposit in
banks in all but the most chaotic situations.  But the increase in deposits coincides with
increased credit to the private sector in only those countries with sound institutional
structures. This suggests that, for countries with weak, but not atrocious, institutional
35development (i.e., 2-4 on the legal index), additional deposits attracted through insurance
are not intermediated effectively. 22
A.  Implicit Versus Explicit Deposit Insurance
In order to obtain unbiased coefficients in our financial development regressions,
we have corrected for potential sample selection bias associated with the adoption of
explicit deposit insurance using a two-stage estimation procedure. Although we are
convinced that this is the correct methodological approach, it does not pernit  us to
compare directly the financial development of countries with explicit schemes with that
of countries that retained implicit deposit insurance.  In this sub-section, we use simple
estimation techniques to make some comparisons between these two groups of countries.
Controlling for income and the average level of inflation from 1990-92, the
partial correlation between explicit deposit insurance and financial depth in 1992 is
actually negative (specifications 1 and 2, Table 5).  The estimated coefficients for the
explicit deposit insurance variable imply large reductions M2/GDP (roughly ten
percentage points).  However, the t-statistic for that coefficient is not significant.  The
models in Table 5 are taken from Cull (1998).  Here we report results only for one
indicator of financial development M2/GDP, but similar results hold for additional
indicators.
Regression analysis of short-term financial deepening provides a somewhat
stronger indication that explicit deposit insurance is negatively associated with financial
development.  Controlling again for inflation, and for income (both changes and levels),
22  In many African countries, a majority of banks'  assets are in government bonds, which is partially
responsible for our results.  That is, in those countries, there is a much greater propensity to channel
36the dumrny variable for explicit deposit insurance is negatively and significantly
associated with changes in M2/GDP (Table 5, specifications 3-4).  The estimated
coefficients indicate that, holding other factors constant, countries with explicit deposit
insurance experienced 2-3% less growth in M2/GDP after the program's  inception than
did the typical country that retained implicit insurance.  The overall fit of the change in
financial depth regressions is good - income level enters positively and significantly;
income changes also enter positively, though insignificantly; and, inflation enters
negatively and significantly.  On the basis of models 1-4, one could conclude that explicit
deposit insurance has typically been negatively correlated with financial development.
However, models 5 and 6 provide some support for the idea that explicit deposit
insurance can contribute to a deeper financial system, but only under the right
circumstances.  In model 5, the interaction of past volatility with explicit deposit
insurance has a negative and significant relationship with short-term changes in
M2/GDP; by contrast, the dummy variable for explicit insurance enters positively and
significantly.  In model 6, the interaction of the rule of law and explicit insurance is
positively linked to changes in M2/GDP;  the dummy variable for explicit insurance
enters negatively and significantly.
We have less faith in these results because of the sample selection bias described
above, and because the explicit insurance dummy variable contains no information about
the design of the program.  However, the results in Table 5 suggest that explicit deposit
insurance has been associated with greater financial depth, but only if past sector
volatility was low or the rule of law (a proxy for the quality of regulation) was well
deposits  to the government  rather  than  private endeavors.
37established.  The conditional nature of these results squares well with the others in the
paper.
B. Deposit  Insurance  and Banking  Sector  Concentration
As with the volatility specifications in Table 3, the growth rate specifications in
Table 4 indicate that entry hurdles have no significant effect on subsequent financial
development.  We found it somewhat surprising that the requirements imposed on
member banks had no effect on the structure (and, therefore, the subsequent perforinance)
of the sector.  As a final empirical exercise, we decided to look a bit more closely at the
relationships between deposit insurance features, sector concentration, and financial
development.  In Table 3, concentration is negatively and significantly linked to volatility
in all four specifications in which it appears.  In Table 6, we present a simple reduced
form to better explain concentration.  Neither index of deposit insurance features,
selection nor generosity, is significantly associated with concentration.  Nor are control
variables like per capita GNP or the legal index.  The only variable with significant
explanatory power is the years since deposit insurance has been in place.  The longer a
deposit insurance scheme has been in place, the less concentrated the sector, regardless of
the specific features of the program.
Although we are not sure about the channel through which deposit insurance
affects the competitive structure of the banking sector, the results in Table 6 might
indicate that, regardless of features such as high entry hurdles, the lure of insured deposits
eventually leads to less concentration.  Those in Table 3 indicate that concentration is
associated with lower financial sector volatility.  The two results may point to another
38channel through which deposit insurance affects financial development.  Its mere
presence may contribute to an increasingly fragmented sector over time, which brings
with it higher volatility, and the specific selection criteria applied to screen member
banks appear to do little to stop it.  We admit that the results on concentration are a bit
more speculative than the others, but they do provide additional support for the notion
that entry hurdles have not been an effective way to curtail the increased volatility that
often accompanies deposit insurance.
VI. Conclusions
Although many countries in advanced and developing economies grant formal
deposit insurance so as to reduce the risk of systemic failure of depository institutions,
our knowledge of the impact of deposit insurance programs on financial development and
stability is quite limited.  This paper has provided empirical evidence on the impact of
deposit insurance on financial development and stability, broadly defined to include the
level of financial activity, the stability of the banking sector, and the quality of resource
allocation as reflected in real sector performance (i.e., growth). We use a unique dataset
capturing a variety of deposit insurance features, such as coverage, entry hurdles,
premium structure, etc.
The empirical construct is guided by recent theories of banking regulation that
employ an agency framework. The basic moral hazard problem studied is the incentive
for depository institutions to engage in excessively high risk activities, relative to socially
optimal outcomes, and it is used to state several testable hypotheses on the impact of
deposit insurance. The overall empirical evidence is consistent with the likelihood that
39deposit insurance leads to financial instability in lax regulatory environments.  However,
the deposit insurance schemes have a desired impact on financial development and
growth in sound regulatory environments as proxied by quality indices of the rule of law.
Thus, the introduction of deposit insurance scheme needs to be accompanied by a sound
regulatory scheme; otherwise, the scheme would lead to instability and deter financial
development.
On the other hand, the results on entry hurdles are rather surprising.  The entry
hurdles, such as the insurance premium requirements on member banks, have no
significant effect on subsequent financial development. These results can be explained in
the context of our theory which suggests that ex ante premia are time-inconsistent and
have no incentive effects once they are in place.  Thus, one cannot expect to impact bank
risk-taking behavior by putting into place entry hurdles alone, unless they are somehow
linked to incentives. Finally, we have a subsidiary empirical result showing that bank
sector concentration is negatively and significantly linked to volatility, but not to deposit
insurance features. On the other hand, the longer a deposit insurance scheme has been in
place, the less concentrated the sector, regardless of the specific features of the program.
The paper lends itself to a number of natural extensions.  For example, deposit
insurance is but one aspect of the incentives produced by the regulatory environment.
Another important regulatory feature that might affect incentives is capital regulation.
Our theory suggests that such regulation has limited effectiveness in reducing financial
volatility, and that, because banks have different investment opportunity sets, a one-size-
fits-all approach to capital regulation is likely inappropriate.  Given adequate cross-
country data, we could incorporate capital regulation into our empirical tests.  The results
40would have implications for the debate on standardization of regulation (e.g., through the
Basle Accord).
More generally, if cross country data were available on multiple aspects of the
regulatory and supervisory environment, we could incorporate better indicators of
institutional development than the rule of law in our empirical work.  Finally, we focus
on bank-based indicators as a proxy for overall financial sector development and
performance. Although banks play a key role in the financial system of most of the
countries in our sample, the increasing importance of capital markets as well as of non-
bank financial institutions (and the growing attention they receive in the literature)
suggests that it may be worthwhile to extend the analysis of this paper to a broader range
of agents and mechanisms which constitute the financial system.
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44Appendix
A Model of Deiosit  Insurance and Risk Shiftig
The main issues in the risk incentive effects of bank deposits and deposit
insurance can be captured in a more formal, but simple framework following John, John
and Senbet (1991) and John, Saunders, and Senbet (2000).
Bank Investment and Financing Environment
Consider a three-date time line.  At the initial date, t=0, the bank collects
deposits while promising depositors an amount F and finances residually through equity
(bank capital). Bank capital infusion is subject to existing regulatory constraints. For
sharper focus, we assume that bank deposits are insured in their entirety (i.e., complete
coverage) by an insuring government agency (e.g., US FDIC).  The agency charges the
relevant insurance premium, it, to be paid by the bank. Thus, we restrict the financing
claims to debt and equity.  Contracts are written and priced at the initial date (i.e., t = 0),
given the information available and the admissible contracting opportunities.
At the intermediate date, t=1, bank insiders or managers make investment
decisions so as to achieve a particular level of investment risk.  For simplicity and for a
focus on optimality of risk choices, bank investment opportunities take two forms: (1)
safe investments with zero risk and non-negative net present value (NPV), and (2) one
from a menu of possible risky investments (loans) which are indexed by a risk parameter
q. Investments of I in riskless projects yield I at at the terminal date, t=2. 23 On the other
hand, the gross cash flow outcomes from the risky projects are high (H) or low (L), with
H>I>L>O,  where q is the probability of the high outcome H, and (1-q) the probability of
the low outcome, L.
There is a moral hazard problem in this framework, since the investment
decisions are taken as "private action" to be undertaken by bank insiders (bank
management).  This notion is captured as follows.  Bank management observes the
parameter q at t=1 before  a choice is made between the riskless invesments and risky
invesments.  The outside stakeholders include bank depositors, bank equityholders, and
regulators, and they do not not observe q. However, bank management is presumed to
work in the best interests of bank owners or those with equity stake. 24 Although q is
observed by insiders only, both insiders and outsiders are assumed to know that q is
distributed uniforrnly over the interval [0,1]. This approach captures the idea that the
bank as an insider faces a discretionary risk choice, since it has additional information
about the characteristics of the investments (say risky loans as captured in q).
23  To focus  on risk incentives,  we ignore issues  of discounting  by assuming  that the base risk free interest  is
zero, so that  investments  of I in riskless  projects  yield I at at the terninal date, t=2.
24 See  John,  Saunders,  and Senbet  (1999)  for the analysis  that incorporates  conflicts  between  management
and bank owners.
45At the final date, t=2, the investments  are liquidated  and the proceeds collected
for gross  cash flows of X (or the loan  proceeds  are collected  at maturity).  If the riskless
investment  was chosen at t=l, X will be equal  to I. Otherwise,  X will be equal to H or L
if the risky investment  was chosen.  If there is a shortfall  relative  to the deposit
obligations,  the government  insurance  agency  honors  the guarantee,  since deposits  are
all insured. Thus, the government  guarantee  payoff is isomporhic  to that of a put option,
max(0,  F-X).
Bank Risk-Shifting  Incentives
Now let us go back to the initial date, t=O,  when all contracts  are priced. Let us
assume  that deposits  are in the form of  pure discount  debt  of promised  payment  F due  at t
= 2. Since  the deposits  are fully  insured,  they  will be priced  as riskless  instruments.  In
addition,  this framework  allows  us to detennine  the deposit  insurance  on a rational
expectations  basis as the fair value of the deposit  insurance  provided.  The risk-shfiting
incentives  and the resulting  investment  distortions  can be characterized  by using as a
benchmark  the optimal  decisions  that would  be undertaken  when the bank faces  no
depository  financing  (say an all-equity  bank funding  its loans  through  bank capital
alone). The optimal  investment  policy  would be one of choosing  between  risky and
riskless  investmnents  (say risky loans and government  bonds).  Thus, at the intermediate
date, t=l, bank management,  working  in the best interests  of bank owners,  observes  q
and decides  to invest in the risky project  if:
qH+(l-q)L>  I  (Al)
That is, bank management  only invests  in the risky project if it has positive  NPV;
otherwise  they invest in the riskless  project,  since it has a zero NPV. Given (Al), there
is a cut-off  value,  q*, of q, such that the risky investment  dominates  the riskless  one. In
other  words, q* is the lowest value of q that satisfies  (Al). This signifies  an investment
policy characterized by [q* ], a policy of investing in the risky asset (loan) for q > q*,
and in the riskless asset (loan) for q < q*  The optimal  investment  policy  is now given
below:
q* = (I -H)/(H - L)  (A2)
The risky projects are chosen only for values q > q*. Given that q is uniformly
distributed  over the interval  [0,1], an investment  policy [q*] produces  the distribution  of
terminal  cashflows  as follows:
H with a probability  l/2[1-q* 2]
I with a probability  q* and
L with a probability l/2[l  1q*]2
Thus, the net present  value of an investment  policy [q*] is given  by
V(q*)=q*I  +  L/2[I-q*] 2 + H/2[1-q* 2]  - I  (A3)
46An all-equity  bank chooses  investment  policy [q*]. Then,  NPV(q*)  is the value
achieved if q is perfectly observed by all the parties. Alternatively, NPV(q*) is the
maximum value that can be achieved under full information and complete contracting.
Then, [q*] is the Pareto efficient investment strategy that we can use as a benchmark for
evaluating the distortions arising from risk shifting due to the introduction of deposits.
The cut-off probability that departs from q* is distortionary relative to the optimal risk
choice.
Now introduce bank deposits, with deposit claims of promised payment F.
Deposits are complements to bank equity capital so that lower F is reflected in larger
bank equity (capital). Thus, for analytical purposes, it is convenient to parameterize the
level of bank equity capital in terms of F,  where F and bank capital are inversely related.
For sufficiently high deposits (or low bank capital), the bank asset cashflows would be
insufficient to repay the depositors in some state of the world (i.e., L < F), inducing the
management to implement a riskier investment policy than [q*]. Formally, the distorted
investment incentives can be characterized as follows. For bank deposits of promised
payment F >  0, the  manager will implement an investment policy [q(F)], where q(F) is
given as:
(a)  Riskless Deposits (F < L):  q(F)  q*
(b) Risky Case (L<F<I):  q(F) =  (I - F)/(H - F)  (A4)
(c) Risky: Extreme (F > I):  q(F) =  0
The proofs are straightforward and they are given in John, John, and Senbet
(1991) and John, Saunders, and Senbet (2000).  Here we wish to provide the intuition.
For any value of deposits with F > L , where in some states the bank fails to honor the
deposit claims, the  manager implements an investment policy [q(F)] which is sub-
optimal (i.e., NPV(q(F) < NPV(q*)) and riskier than the efficient  one, [q*] s, i.e.,  q(F)
<  (q*) . To see this, consider an arbitrary cut-off probability level.  When the cut-off
probability (qc) is varied from 1 to 0, the value of the terminal cash flows, expressed as
(A3), increases from I to V (qj) and then decreases to (H +L)/2.  The maximum value is
achieved when qc =q*.  The volatility of the terminal cash flows,  or(qc)  can also be
specified in the like manner.  As the cut-off (q,)  is varied from 1 to 0, co(qc)  varies from
0 to [(H - L)/2]2 . Thus, the cut-off probability can be thought of an index of volatility
(risk), and risk increases with decreasing qc.
We can actually characterize the pair of value-risk [V (q), G(q)] so that, as  risk
as  (qc) increases from 0 to ca  (q*),  the value increases first I to V (q*).  With any further
increases in risk beyond a(q*), the value declines.  The investment opportunity shape
that would be generated  would be similar to Figure 2 in the text.  Now in the presence
of depository financing, the bank insiders will invest for values of q >  q(F), where the
residual pay-offs of the equity-holders are higher than those for safe investment
[(q max(0, H -F) + (1 - q) max(0, L - F) >  max (0, I - F)], and  hence
47(I - F)/(H - F) = q(F) < q* = (I - L)/(H - L).
Thus, in the range of (b) above,  the terminal  cashflow  distribution  resulting  from
the investment  policy [q(F)], implemented  by the manager  is strictly  increasing  in risk for
increasing  F, such that a c(q(F)) / 8 F > 0, and decreasing  in value,  i.e.,8  NPV(q(F))  / a
F3< 0. This establishes  the basis for the predictions  on volatility  effect of deposits
(financial instability effect) and value effect (economic inefficiency effect) in the text.
48Table  1: Deposit Insurance  Program  Features,  Pairwise  Correlations
Variable  Depositor Coverage Variables  Bank Membership Variables
'Genersity"  "Entry  Hurdles"
Coverage  Foreign  Interbank  Source  Manage-  Co-  Cornpul-  Funded Ex  Premium  Risk-
Currency  ment  insurance  sory  ante?  Adjusted
Coverage  1.00
(2.13)  (n=29)
Foreign  -0.13  1.00
(0.55)  (n  29)  (n=29)
Interbank  0.15  -0.05  1.00
(0.21)  (n=29)  (n=29)  (n=29)
Source  0.07  0.40  0.08  1.00
(0.76)  (n-=29)  (n=29)  (n=29)  (n=29)
Management  -0.12  -0.03  -0.37**  -0.25  1.00
(1.59)  (n=29)  (n=29)  (n=29)  (n=29)  (n=29)
Co-insurance  -0.12  0.02  -0.09  -0.21  0.19  1.00
(0.24)  (n-=29)  (n=29)  (n=29)  (n=29)  (n=29)  (n=29)
Compulsory  0.14  0.03  0.14  0.14  0.20  0.15  1.00
(0.93)  (n=29)  (n=29)  (n=29)  (n=29)  (n=29)  (n=29)  (n=29)
Funded ex ante  0.14  0.06  0.32*  0.16  -0.51***  -0.37**  0.14  1.00
(0.72)  (n=-29)  (n=29)  (n=29)  (n=29)  (n=29)  (n=29)  (n=29)  (n=29)
Premium  -0.10  -0.22  0.06  -0.04  -0.22  -0.19  0.15  0.38*  1.00
(0.31)  (n=27)  (n=27)  (n=27)  (n=27)  (n=27)  (n=27)  (n=27)  (n=27)  (n=27)
Risk-adjusted  0.01  0.41  **  -0.23  0.22  0.23  -0.04  0.12  0.08  -0.07  1.00
(0.17)  (n=29)  (n=29)  (n=29)  (n=29)  (n=29)  (n=29)  (n=729)  (n=29)  (n=27)  (n=29)
Table  I provides  pairwise  correlations  between  deposit  insurance  program  features. Coverage  is a continuous  variable  equal  to the coverage  limnit  divided  by GDP per capita. Foreign
Currency  is a dummy  variable  = I if foreign  currency  deposits  are covered. Interbank  is a dummy  variable  = I if interbank  deposits  are covered. Source  is a discrete  variable  = 0 if the
source  of the program's  funding  is banks,  = I if banks and government,  and = 2 if government  only. Management  is a discrete  variable  = I if the program  is officially  managed  (i.e.,  by
govemment),  = 2 ifjointly managed  by official  and private  entities,  and = 3 if solely  privately  managed. Co-insurance  is a dunmmy  variable  = I if depositors  must pay a deductible  to
receive  compensation  after a bank closure. Compulsory  is a dummy  variable  = I if bank membership  in the program  is compulsory.  Funded  ex ante  is dummy  variable = I if member
banks  pay contributions  prior to bank failures  (as opposed  to in response  to them). Premium  is the premium  payments  required  of member  banks,  expressed  as a percentage  of insured
deposits. Risk-adjusted  is a dummy  variable  = I if member  banks' premium  payments  are adjusted  to reflect  the risk of their assets.
Variable  Means  in () in first column. * indicates  significantly  different  from zero at the 10%  level; ** indicates  significance  at the 5% level; *** indicates  significance  at the 1%  level.
Deposit  insurance  system  features  are taken  from Demirguc-Kunt,  Asli,  and Enrica  Detragiache,  "Does  Deposit  Insurance  Increase  System  Stability?  An Empirical  Investigation,"  July,
1999.  Demirguc-Kunt  and Detragiache  relied  on information  from numerous  sources  including  Kyei,  Alexander,  1995,  "Deposit  Protection  Arrangements:  A Survey,"  IMF working  paper
WP/90/134  and Garcia,  Gillian,  1999,  "Deposit  Insurance:  A Survey  of Actual  and Best  Practices,"  IMF  working  paper  WP/99/54.
49Table 2: Financial Development and Deposit Insurance Features, Pairwise Correlations
Deposit  Concentration  Coefficient of  Coefficient of  Growth Rate  Growth Rate
Insurance  Ratio  Variation,  Variation,  (Liquid Liab  (Credit to
Feature  (assets of top 3  (Liquid Liab  (Credit to  /GDP)  Private Sector
banks relative  /GDP)  Private Sector  /GDP)
to sector)  /GDP)_
Mean  .63  Mean  .12  Mean  .18  Mean  0.7%  Mean  0.5%
St Dev .16  StDev.10  St Dev .16  St Dev  4.0%  StDev  6.1%
Min  .36  Min  .02  Min  .03  Min  -10.9%  Min  -15.4%
Max  .88  Max  .34  Max  .68  Max  6.9%  Max  9.9%
Coverage  -0.03  0.02  -0.29  0.10  0.12
(n=29)  (n=27)  (n=28)  (n=28)  (n=28)
Foreign Curr.  -0.07  -0.46**  -0.07  -0.04  -0.18
(n=29)  (n=27)  (n=28)  (n=28)  (n=28)
Interbank  -0.00  0.36*  0.06  -0.11  0.00
(n=29)  (n=27)  (n=28)  (n-=28)  (n=28)
Source  0.11  -0.10  -0.10  -0.24  -0.18
(n=29)  (n=27)  (n=28)  (n=28)  (n=28)
Management  -0.22  -0.01  0.28  -0.02  -0.05
(n=29)  (n=27)  (n=28)  (n=28)  (n=28)
Co-insurance  -0.52***  0.18  0.16  0.29  0.23
(n=29)  (n-=27)  (n=28)  (n=28)  (n=28)
Compulsory  -0.27  0.20  0.17  -0.00  -0.07
(n=29)  (n=27)  (n=28)  (n=28)  (n=28)
Funded  0.33*  0.17  -0.09  -0.04  -0.07
(n=29)  (n=27)  (n=28)  (n=28)  (n=28)
Prernium  0.12  0.28  0.30  -0.59***  -0.44***
(n-=27)  (n=725)  (n=26)  (n=26)  (n=26)
Risk-adjusted  0.07  -0.19  -0.16  -0.06  -0.19
(n=29)  (n=-27)  (n=28)  (n=28)  (n=28)
Table  2 provides  pairwise  correlations  between  deposit  insurance  program  features  and indicators  of financial
development.  The indicators  include  a measure  of sector  concentration  equal  to the assets of the three  largest  banks
relative  to the total  for the sector,  and two measures  of banking  sector  volatility,  one measured  as the coefficient  of
variation  (standard  deviation  divided  by mean)  for the ratio of liquid liabilities  to GDP,  and another  measured  as the
coefficient  of variation  for  the ratio of credit  to the private  sector  to GDP. Finally,  there  are two indicators  measuring
the growth  rate of indicators  of financial  development,  one for  the ratio of liquid  liabilities  to GDP,  another  for the ratio
of credit  to the private  sector  to GDP.
Deposit  insurance  features  are explained  in the text and in  the notes  to Table 1.
* indicates  significantly  different  from zero at the 10%  level; ** indicates  significance  at the 5% level; ***  indicates
significance  at the I% level.
50Table 3: Effects of Deposit Insurance on the Volatility of Financial Development
Indicators
Explanatory  Depedent Variable
Variable  Ln(Coeff  Ln(Coeff  Ln(Coeff  Ln(Coeff  Ln(Coeff  Ln(Coeff
Var BNK)'  Var BNK)  Var BNK)  Var LL)b  Var LL)  Var LL)
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
First Stage
Rule of Law  .415*  .364**  .344*  .325**  .366**  .299**
(1.84)  (2.13)  (1.71)  (2.16)  (2.36)  (2.04)
Past Volatility of  -9.80  -7.05  -7.83  -7.45**  -7.63**  -7.13*





Generosity  1.84*  0.97*  0.98*  1.78**  1.40***  1.34***
(1.84)  (1.89)  (1.79)  (2.06)  (5.08)  (2.91)
Generosity x Law  -0.37  -0.21*  -0.23*  -0.36*  -0.30***  -0.32**
(1.60)  (1.74)  (1.81)  (1.79)  (4.25)  (2.28)
Poor Selection  .085  -.379
(0.09)  (1.09)
Poor Selection xLaw  -0.96  .038
(0.39)  (0.27)
Inflation  -.014  .005  -.014  -.066  .011  .012
(0.39)  (0.02)  (0.50)  (0.24)  (0.43)  (0.05)
Real Growi  -.174  -.065  -.027  -.273  -.011  .029
(0.64)  (0.38)  (0.14)  (1.41)  (0.10)  (0.22)
Years in Place  -.039  .014  .095  -.047  .085  .017
(0.98)  (0.51)  (0.29)  (1.29)  (0.67)  (0.61)
Concentration  -2.80***  -2.57*  -3.82***  -3.87***
(2.97)  (1.84)  (4.04)  (3.57)
Observations  56  56  53  56  56  53
#  with Explicit DI  27  27  24  27  27  24
Log Likelihood  -53.08  -43.78  -37.98  -60.68  -47.75  -43.80
(a) BNK  is the ratio  of bank credit  to the private  sector  to GDP. (b) LL is the ratio of liquid  liabilities  to GDP. The
dependent  variables  are the log  of the coefficient  of variation  (standard  deviation  divided  by mean)  for BNK and for
LL. They  are intended  to measure  the volatility  of financial  development.
We  employ  a two-stage  estimation  technique  to correct  for  sample  selection  bias associated  with the adoption  of
explicit  deposit  insurance.  In the first  stage,  explanatory  variables  include 'Law,' a six-point  measure  of the quality  of
the rule  of law averaged  over 1985-1992  (see data  appendix  for  further  description).  Higher  values  indicate  greater
adherence  to the rule  of law. The  other  first stage  regressors  are measures  of past financial  sector  volatility,  calculated
over  all years  prior to the adoption  of explicit  deposit  insurance  (from 1960-1997).  'Volatility  BNK' is the coefficient
of variation  (standard  deviation  divided  by mean)  for BNK. 'Volatility  LL' is the coefficient  of variation  for  LL.
The second  stage  estimation  is conditional  on the adoption  of deposit  insurance.  Regressors  include  'generosity'  a
principal  components  index  derived  from six deposit  insurance  program  features  - coverage  limits, coverage  of foreign
currency  deposits,  coverage  of interbank  deposits,  the program's  funding  source,  its management  type,  and co-
insurance  requirements  (deductibles).  'Poor Selection'  is a principle  components  index of four  program  features  that
describe  the requirements  that are imposed  upon  member  banks:  compulsory  membership  requirements,  ex-ante
funding  requirements,  premium  levels,  and requirements  that  premium  be risk-adjusted  for the assets  held by the
member  bank. Program  features  are more  fully  described  in the text  and in the notes to Table 1. 'Law,' which is used
as an interaction  term in the second  stage,  is computed  as described  above.
51Inflation  and real growth  are averaged  over  all years for  which data  are available  from 1960-97  (again,  all years  after
the adoption  of explicit  deposit  insurance).  Concentration  is computed  in the same  way. It measures  the share  of total
banking  sector assets  held  by the three  largest  banks  in the country. Years in place  is simply  the number  of years  that
explicit  deposit  insurance  has been in place.
* indicates  significantly  different  from zero at the 10%  level;  ** indicates  significance  at the 5%  level;  *** indicates
significance  at the 1%  level.
52Table 4: Effects of Deposit Insurance on the Growth Rate of Financial Development
Explanatory  Dependent Variable
Variable  BNKa  BNK  BNK  BNK  LO  - LL  LL  LL
Growth  Growth  Growth  Growth  Growth  Growth  Growth  Growth
Rate  Rate  Rate  Rate  Rate  Rate  Rate  Rate
_  _  (1)  ~~~~~~(2)  - 3)  (4)  - (5)  (6)  (7)  - (8)
First Stage
Law  .442***  .590***  .418***  .419***  .349***  .496***  .320***  .350***
(4.01)  (4.85)  (4.06)  (4.26)  (3.79)  (3.14)  (3.23)  (3.79)
Volatility  -10.6***  -10.18**
BNK  (3.66)  (2.18)
Volatility  -13.01**  -13.55**  -11.5***  -10.2***  -9.79***  -10.2***





Generosity  -.071***  -.059**  -.064**  -.067***  -.034**  -.038  -.036**  -.033**
(3.24)  (2.24)  (2.35)  (2.72)  (2.15)  (1.57)  (2.20)  (2.05)
Generosity x Law  .018***  .015**  .014**  .017***  .075**  .086  .074**  .074**
(3.72)  (2.39)  (2.00)  (3.22)  (2.06)  (1.56)  (1.97)  (1.99)
Poor Selection  -.020  .018
(0.42)  (0.36)
Poor Selection xLaw  .067  -.052
(0.50)  (0.47)
Inflation  -.044***  -.037**  -.044***  -.037***  -.024***  -.023***  -.025***  -.024***
(4.82)  (2.55)  (2.94)  (2.82)  (4.00)  (4.27)  (2.87)  (3.77)
Real Growth  .014***  .014**  .013  .014**  .098***  .096***  .098  .096***
(2.81)  (2.03)  (1.33)  (2.41)  (3.41)  (3.29)  (1.62)  (3.13)
Years in Place  .011  .006  .011  .016  .004  .004  .004  .004
(1.04)  (0.50)  (0.66)  (1I.10)  (0.78)  (0.78)  (0.55)  (0.53)
Concentration  -.023  .212
(0.51)  (0.08)
Observations  57  57  54  57  57  56  54  57
#  with Explicit DI  28  28  25  28  28  27  25  28
Log Likelihood  33.20  33.31  29.86  32.41  46.17  47.17  40.83  46.18
(a) BNK is the ratio of bank credit  to the private  sector  to GDP. (b) LL is the ratio of liquid liabilities  to GDP. The
dependent  variables  are growth  rates  for BNK and for LL. They  are intended  to measure  the rate of financial  sector
development.  There  is one observation  per country,  and growth  rates are calculated  as an average  over  all years  after
the adoption  of deposit  insurance  for  which data are available  from 1960-1997.
We employ  a two-stage  estimation  technique  to correct  for sample  selection  bias associated  with the adoption  of
explicit  deposit  insurance.  In the first stage,  explanatory  variables  include 'Law,' a six-point  measure  of the quality  of
the rule  of law averaged  over 1985-1992  (see data appendix  for further  description).  Higher  values  indicate  greater
adherence  to the rule  of law. The  other  first stage  regressors  are measures  of past financial  sector  volatility,  calculated
over  all years  prior  to the adoption  of explicit  deposit  insurance  (from  1960-1997).  'Volatility  BNK' is the coefficient
of variation  (standard  deviation  divided  by mean) for  BNK. 'Volatility  LL' is the coefficient  of variation  for LL.
The  second  stage  estimation  is conditional  on the adoption  of deposit  insurance.  Regressors  include 'generosity'  a
principal  components  index derived  from six deposit  insurance  program  features  -- coverage  limits, coverage  of
foreign  currency  deposits,  coverage  of interbank  deposits,  the program's  funding  source,  its management  type,  and co-
insurance  requirements  (deductibles).  'Poor Selection' is a principle  components  index  of four  program  features  that
describe  the requirements  that are imposed  upon member  banks:  compulsory  membership  requirements,  ex-ante
53funding  requirements,  premium  levels,  and requirements  that premium  be risk-adjusted  for  the assets  held by the
member  bank. Program  features  are more fully  described  in the text and in the notes to Table 1.  'Law,' which  is used
as an interaction  term in the second  stage,  is computed  as described  above.
Inflation  and real growth  are averaged  over all years  for  which data  are available  from 1960-97  (again,  all years  after
the adoption  of explicit  deposit  insurance). Concentration  is computed  in the same  way. It measures  the share  of total
banking  sector  assets  held by the three largest  banks in the country. Years in place is simply  the number  of years  that
explicit  deposit  insurance  has been in place.
* indicates  significantly  different  from  zero at the 10%  level; **  indicates  significance  at the 5% level; ***  indicates
significance  at the 1% level.
54Table 5: Effects of Implicit Versus Explicit Deposit Insurance on Levels and Growth Rates of
Financial Development
Explanatory  Dep Variable:  Level of  Dep Variable: Average Change in M2/GDP, 1980-95
Variable  M2/GDP, 1992
(1)  (21  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6
Constant  0.275  0.283  2.268  1.800"  -1.48  .333
(7.06)  (7.02)  (3.15)  (2.01)  (1.11)  (0.25)
Per Capita Inc  0.043  0.043  0.247"  0.276
(6.51)  (6.48)  (2.29)  (2.21)
Explicit  -0.097  -0.104  -2.980  -2.867  3.79  -3.02
(1.53)  (1.62)  (3.58)  (2.85)  (2.36)  (1.85)
Explicit x Past  -.576
Volatility  (3.67)
Past Volatility  .357"  .211"
(3.54)  (2.16)
Explicit x Law  .688*)
(2.08)
Avg Inflation  -.004  -0.084  -0.080"  -.093  -.093.
(0.83)  (5.71)  (4.70)  (5.42)  (4.85)
% change, Real  0.276  .108  .174
Per Capita GDP  (1.39)  (0.79)  (1.16)
Adj. R-Squared  .49  .47  .52  .46  .58  .47
Observations  51  51  43  40  40  40
Table  5 provides  partial  correlations  between  explicit  deposit  insurance  and the level of financial  depth in 1992  (models
I and 2). It also  provides  partial  correlations  between  explicit  deposit  insurance  and average  changes  in financial  depth
from 1980-1995  (models  3-6). The  table is designed  to provide  information  on the effects  of explicit  versus  implicit
insurance  on financial  development.  See Cull (1998)  for models  that use additional  indicators  of financial  development
as dependent  variables.
Models  (1) and (2): The dependent  variable  is M2 divided  by GDP  in 1992. 'Per capita  income' in 1992  is taken  from
the Summers  and Heston  database,  and is measured  in $US 1985. 'Explicit' is a dummy  variable  = I if a country  had
an explicit  deposit  insurance  program  in 1992. 'Avg. Inflation' is measured  as an average  percentage  change in the
consumer  price  index from 1990-92.
Models  (3)-(6): The  dependent  variable  is the three-year  change  in M2/GDP  (i.e.,  M2/GDP 3 - M2IGDPO).  For
countries  that adopted  explicit  insurance,  the dependent  variable  is measured  over  the three years  just after  the
program's  adoption.  For those  countries  that maintained  implicit  deposit  insurance  (the  control  category),  changes  in
financial  depth  were first calculated  over  all possible  three  year periods  from 1980-95;  those  three-year  figures  where
then averaged.  The same  procedure  was used to compute  average  inflation  rates, % changes  in real per capita  GDP,
and 'past volatility.'  Past volatility  is defined  as the coefficient  of variation  in M2/GDP  (standard  deviation  divided  by
mean).
As in models  I and 2, 'Per capita  income' in 1992  is taken  from the Summers  and Heston  database,  and is measured  in
$US 1985.  'Law' is a six-point  measure  of the quality  of the rule of law averaged  over 1985-1992  (see data  appendix
for further  description).
* indicates  significantly  different  from zero at the 10%  level; **  indicates  significance  at the 5% level; ***  indicates
significance  at the I% level.
55Table  6: Effects of Deposit  Insurance  on Banking  Sector  Concentration
Explanatory Variable  Dep: Concentration Ratio (Top 3 banks)












Adj R-square  .17
The  dependent  variable,  'Concentration  Ratio,' is intended  to measure  the degree  of concentration  in the banking
sector. It is equal  to the share  of total sector  assets  attributable  to the three largest  banks. There is one observation  per
country,  and the concentration  ratio is calculated  as an average  over  all years  for which  data are available  from 1960-
1997.
Regressors  include  'generosity' a principal  components  index  derived  from six deposit  insurance  program  features  --
coverage  limits,  coverage  of foreign  currency  deposits,  coverage  of interbank  deposits,  the program's  funding  source,
its management  type,  and co-insurance  requirements  (deductibles).  'Poor Selection'  is a principle  components  index  of
four  program  features  that describe  the requirements  that are imposed  upon  member  banks:  compulsory  membership
requirements,  ex-ante  funding  requirements,  premium  levels,  and requirements  that premium  be risk-adjusted  for the
assets  held by the member  bank. Program  features  are more  fully  described  in the text and in the notes  to Table l.
'Law,' a six-point  measure  of the quality  of the rule of law is averaged  over 1985-1992  (see data  appendix  for further
description).  Higher  values  indicate  greater  adherence  to the rule  of law. GNP per capita  is taken  from Summers  and
Heston.  'Years in Place' is simply  the number  of years  that explicit  deposit  insurance  has been in place.
* indicates  significantly  different  from zero at the 10%  level; **  indicates  significance  at the 5% level;  *** indicates
significance  at the 1%  level.
56Data Appendix
Countries included in active observation set (57)
Explicit Deposit Insurance:  Austria, Belgium, Bangladesh, Brazil, Canada, Chile,
Colombia, Denmark, Finland, France, Great Britain, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy,
Kenya, Luxembourg, Nigeria, Netherlands, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sri
Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago, Venezuela.
Implicit Deposit Insurance: Australia, China, Cote d'Ivoire, Costa Rica, Egypt, Ghana,
Guatemala, Guyana, Hong Kong, Honduras, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Libya,
Malaysia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Paraguay, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa,
Syria, Togo, Thailand, Uruguay, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
NOTE: Our empirical analysis of the impact of different deposit insurance features on financial
development employs a post hoc, ergo propter hoc  approach. In other words, our indicators of
financial development and volatility are averaged for each country over all the years in the sample
following the adoption of an explicit deposit insurance system. The years of adoption of explicit
deposit insurance for all countries in our sample are shown in the following table.
country  Year adopted  country  Year adopted
AUT  1979  HRV  1997
BEL  1974  HUN  1993
BGD  1984  IRL  1989
BRA  1995  ITA  1987
CAN  1967  KEN  1985
CHE  1984  LUX  1989
CHL  1986  NGA  1988
COL  1985  NLD  1979
DNK  1988  PHL  1963
ESP  1977  POL  1995
FIN  1969  PRT  1992
FRA  1980  SWE  1996
GBR  1982  TTO  1986
GRC  1993  VEN  1985
57Variable names, definitions and sources.
Variable  Name  Definition  Source
Growth Rate of Bank Credit  Average annual growth rate in the  Ratio equals IFS (line 551)
ratio of bank credit to the private  divided by IFS (line 99b)
sector to GDP
Growth Rate of Liquid Liabilities  Average annual growth rate in the  Ratio equals IFS (lines 22a-d)
ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP  divided by IFS (line 99b)
Law and Order  Index of the quality of the rule of  ICRG
law ranging from 0 to 6; scores
for each country average over
data for 1985-1991.
Generosity  Principal components index of six  Features are from Demirguc-Kunt
deposit insurance features (Table  and Detragiache (1999)
4)
Entry Hurdles  Principal components index of  Features are from Demirguc-Kunt
five deposit insurance features  and Detragiache (1999)
(Table 4)
Volatility in Bank Credit  Coefficient of variation (standard  IFS (see above)
deviation/mean) in the ratio of
bank credit to nominal GDP.
Volatility in Liquid Liabilities  Coefficient of variation in the  IFS (see above)
ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP
Inflation  Average inflation  SIMA (wdi, ifs)
Real Growth  Rate of growth of real GDP  SIMA (wdi, ifs)
Years in Place  Years since the adoption of  Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache
explicit deposit insurance  (1999)
Concentration  Assets of largest three banks  Beck, Dermirguc-Kunt,  Levine
divided by total banking assets  (1999) [from Bankscope]
ICRG is the International Country Risk Guide, published by Political Risk Service, Syracuse, NY.  IFS is
International Financial Statistics, published by the IMF.
58Payoffs to bank
stakeholders
Max  (O,  X-F)
Payoff  to  to
owners 
/  ~~~~~~~~Min  (X,  F)
4 /-Qi&\  /  ~~~~~Payoff  to
depositors
(uninsured)
F  Bank cash flow (X)
Figure 1:  Partitioning  of Income from Bank Asset Portfolio
59Bank value
I  Value  under  bank
asset  risk-shifting
1
;  \  ~~~~~~~~Bank  2
Bank  I
orI*  or1 Risk (a)
Figure 2: Bank Investment Opportunities
60Bank value  V1(a)
a  1*  a  2*  or2*  Risk(or)
Figure 3:  Capital Requirements and Multiple Banks
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